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 Abstract 
This paper focuses on the different forms of action adopted by extreme right organizations 
(both political parties and non-party groups) in Italy and Spain during their recent 
mobilization and links them to the environmental conditions and internal organizational 
factors which might affect them. With particular attention paid to the actors’ perceptions of 
reality, the macro-level factors (such as the favourable or unfavourable political opportunities 
of the context, the availability of allies in power, the degree of repression by authorities, etc.) 
as well as the meso-level factors (such as the internal characteristics of extreme right groups 
and their dynamics) will be explored in order to understand the action strategies of extreme 
right organizations and their recourse to violence.  This paper, drawing on a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research techniques, will be based on 20 semi-structured 
interviews with extreme right representatives of the main right wing organizations in Italy and 
Spain as well as a protest event analysis of newspapers dating from 2005 to 2009.  
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I.  Introduction 
Collective actors can rely on a broad range of tactics, aimed at expressing their claims and 
influencing decision-makers or public opinion. Such action strategies (conventional and 
unconventional) can differ greatly either in the logic that drives them and/or in the degree of 
radicalism they imply (della Porta, Diani 2006, p. 165). 
Since the mid-1990s many Western European democracies have seen a resurgence of right 
wing extremism: waves of protest and political campaigns initiated by extreme right parties, 
extra parliamentary organizations, and single activists. Immigration policies, the adhesion to 
the Euro, unemployment and social and economic policies, all came under sharp criticism 
from the right spectrum of political forces (see Mudde, 2007). Italy and Spain are not 
exceptions. Extreme right mobilization is, however, not limited to the institutional political 
arena but, as reported with growing concern by government investigations1, it can take 
different forms, including violence.   
Despite the recently growing scientific interest in (and social relevance of) the extreme right, 
empirical studies on the strategic action choices of these groups are still scarce. On the one 
hand, research on right wing extremism has mainly developed within electoral studies and 
focused on extreme right political parties and electoral behavior (e.g. Carter, 2005; Norris, 
2005), with little consideration of non-party organizations (della Porta 2012). On the other 
hand, when focusing on right wing political violence, analyses tended to follow ‘breakdown’ 
theories, detecting macro historical trends towards declining/arising violent forms (as 
irrational responses in times of system’s crisis); while social movement approaches, more 
attentive to actor’s intentionality in action choices, have been used to analyze mainly left-
wing radicalism (della Porta, 2008) (for exceptions, Koopmans et al. 2005; Caiani et al. 
2012). In addition, despite the large volume of research (e.g. in terrorism studies) analyzing 
‘when’ and ‘why’ collective actors use violence (for a review, Borum, 2004), the attention to 
right-wing extremism is rarer. 
In this article, focusing on different types of extreme right organizations in Italy and Spain 
(political parties, political movements and subcultural youth groups)2 and using a 
                                                     
1 See for instance the Europol’s TE-SAT Report 2010: (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TE-
SAT%202010.pdf) or the annual country monitoring reports by the European Commission Against Racism and 
Intolerance  of the Council of Europe (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp)  
2 In the literature, Mudde has found 26 different ways of defining the extreme right. Some scholars (e.g. Carter, 
2005) define right-wing extremism using two criteria: anti-constitutionalism and anti-democratic values (this is the 
reason it is called extremist), and a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality (this is the reason it is 
called right wing). Others (e.g. Norris, 2005) prefer the label radical right in order to describe those political parties 
and non-party organizations that are located toward one pole on the standard ideological left–right scale. Despite 
the still open debate on conceptual definition and terminology (which is beyond the scope of this article to address in 
detail), we use, interchangeably, the term extreme/radical right to refer to those groups that exhibit in their common 
ideological cores the characteristics of nationalism, xenophobia (ethno-nationalist xenophobia), antiestablishment 
critiques and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values) (Mudde 2007). 
8 — Caiani; Borri / Between Violent and Non-Violent Action Strategies — I H S  
 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data, we will investigate the strategies of action by 
these organizations and the factors which might affect them. We are indeed interested in 
‘what produces a shift towards more brutal forms of action, namely the escalation of conflict 
strategies’ (della Porta 2005, p. 4), conceived as ‘increases in severity of coercive 
inducement used and increases in the scope of participants within a conflict’ (ibid.). From a 
theoretical point of view, we build on (and try to combine) hypotheses developed in social 
movement and political violence & terrorism research, two fields having scarce 
communication with each other (della Porta, 2008). On the one hand, social movement 
scholars suggest studying the development of radical strategies by looking at the broader 
‘repertoire of action’ used by collective actors, which can vary according to open/closed 
contextual (political and cultural) circumstances and ‘protest cycles’ (Tarrow, 1989). On the 
other hand, the literature on extremism and political violence has highlighted specific macro 
and micro/meso-level factors which can favour it, although a common agreement on the 
main causes is still lacking. There are those which emphasize, at an individual level, the role 
of psychological characteristics of extremists and their values and motivations (e.g. 
Richardson, 2006; Horgan, 2005); those who focus, at a systemic level, on the 
environmental conditions and on the social and political contexts that influence actors’ 
strategic choices (e.g. Gurr, 2005 and Paz, 2004); and finally, those explanations, at a meso-
level, insisting on organizations as entrepreneurs of violence and organizational dynamics 
(e.g. Goodwin, 2006; della Porta, 1995). With specific reference to right wing extremism, 
economic and social crises are mentioned (Prowe, 2004), as well as political instability, allies 
in power (Koopmans 2005), the legacy of an authoritarian past (Chirumbolo, 1996), youth 
sub-cultures and hooliganism (Bjorgo, 1995) and the diffusion of xenophobic values within 
the society (Rydgren, 2005); whereas it is controversial whether social support for radical 
groups decreases or incentivizes violence (Sageman, 2004). These factors are generally 
analyzed in isolation and there are few attempts to integrate them in a comprehensive and 
dynamic interpretation of political radicalism, taking into account the context of both external 
and internal (group) factors (for exceptions, della Porta, 1995,Crenshaw, 1995). This is what 
we will try to do in this article.   
Drawing on data from semi-structured interviews with representatives of Italian and Spanish 
extreme right organizations and on a protest event analysis of their recent mobilization 
(2005-2009), we shall look at the strategic action choices of the extreme right, linking them to 
a multi-level theoretical framework considering both the organizational characteristics and 
circumstances. In particular, regarding the macro-level factors, we will refer to the favourable 
or vice versa unfavourable ‘political opportunities’3 available for the extreme right in the two 
countries (in terms of legal constraints and authorities’ repression, degree of political 
legitimation and social support, etc.), which, according to social movement literature, can 
greatly influence the mobilization and the forms it takes (Tarrow, 1989; Mc Adam et. al. 
                                                     
3 According to Kitschelt (1986, p. 58) ‘political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configuration of 
resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the 
development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others’. 
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2001). More specifically, with regard to violence, the importance of the so-called ‘policing of 
protest’– i.e. the way authorities manage collective action (della Porta, 1995, p. 55) – will be 
underlined. Indeed, rigid legal constraints and state coercion are considered key factors for 
the contenders’ escalation into violence (della Porta, 1995; della Porta and Reiter, 1998). 
However, in our study, in line with the recent ‘cultural turn’ in sociology, which criticizes the 
instrumental and interest-based biases of resource mobilization and political opportunity 
approaches (Goodwin et al 2001, 2004; Jasper 2004), we emphasize the actors’ symbolic 
construction of reality, giving particular attention to the perception that extreme right groups 
have of the context of external opportunities and (internal) resources in which they mobilize. 
We indeed assume that action choices are not necessarily tied to utilitarian calculations, but 
instead are affected by emotions and other cognitive and normative aspects (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 1999, p. 29; della Porta, 2011, pp. 7-12) related to the collective actors’ internal and 
external reality. Accordingly, in this article, we shall expect that extreme right organizations 
tend to mobilize more radically when they deal with a (perceived) closed context (i.e. stricter 
legal constraints and repression by the authorities, lack of institutional recognition etc.). 
Conversely, we hypothesize that more moderate action strategies will be found where 
groups perceive an opener context of political opportunities.  
As for meso-level factors, taking into account the role played by the resources which 
collective actors can mobilize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), we will look at some organizational 
characteristics of the right wing groups (i.e. the degree of internal pluralism, the barriers to 
group’ access, the rigidity of internal discipline, etc.) that we consider to influence, either 
directly or indirectly, their mobilization and action strategies. We indeed assume that 
organizational and contextual factors are mutually related and that organizational 
characteristics might influence the way reality is interpreted, therefore affecting the actors’ 
assessment of opportunity and constraints and, in turn, their action forms (Meyer et al., 
2002, pp.126-136). Therefore, we expect that organizations ‘more closed’ toward the outside 
(i.e. characterized by low internal pluralism and high levels of selectivity), as well as ruled by 
a rigid discipline, are more likely to adopt a more radical behaviour, since the ‘in-group 
thinking’ favours violent radicalization (della Porta, 1995, p. 84). To the contrary, we expect 
that organizations that are more internally diversified, flexible and democratic, will tend to 
recur less frequently to violence4. Beyond this, however, we also expect to find some 
differences in the strategic choices of different types of extreme right organizations. In 
particular, more institutionalized organizations (such as political parties) keen to use 
conventional actions along with less formal groups (such as youth sub-cultural organizations 
and political movements) are more likely to resort to violence. 
 
                                                     
4 More specifically, a strict(er) internal discipline might favour the adoption of a more radical behaviour by allowing 
for an higher degree of control of the organizations over their members and by heightening the so-called ‘need for 
group bonding and belonging’, a key element of violent radicalization (Pressman, 2009, p. 21). 
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II.  Methods and Sources 
Our analysis is based on 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives (i.e. 
leaders, spokespersons) of different types of extreme right organizations (political parties, 
political movements and sub-cultural youth and skinhead groups) in Spain and Italy5. Our 
sampling strategy, is based on sources of different kinds (academic literature, electoral data, 
reports from democratic observatories) and we have identified about 3-4 of the most 
important organizations for each category per country. For the Italian case, regarding political 
parties, we selected three organizations that are commonly associated with the far right6: the 
Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (direct heir of the post-fascist party MSI, created in 
1995 by the most radical members refusing to converge into the new and more moderate 
Alleanza Nazionale), La Destra di Storace (born in 2007 by the split of the right-wing 
Alleanza Nazionale, considered by the party as too ‘centrist’ and moderate) and the Fronte 
Sociale Nazionale (‘Lepenist’ formation, faithful to the doctrine of fascist corporatism and 
socialization). As for political movements, we included some groups active between the 
institutional and societal arenas: Area Destra, Nuova Destra Sociale and the Movimento 
Nazional Popolare (all part of the so-called ‘social right’, inspired by the fascist doctrine of 
the ‘third way’ between capitalism and communism) and the movement Fascismo e Libertà, 
close to historical fascism. With regard to sub-cultural groups, we selected the youth group 
Patria Nostra (a neo-fascist formation), the more moderate Gioventù Italiana, Casapound 
(set up in 2003 as a ‘squatted’ right-wing social center), Lotta Studentesca (a student 
movement close to the radical party Forza Nuova) and the Veneto Fronte Skinhead (the 
most relevant and violent skinhead organization in Italy, EUMC 2004) 
In the Spanish case, regarding political parties, we selected the current most relevant 
organizations related to the nostalgic phalangist area (Falange Española, Falange Autentica 
and Falange de las JONS), plus more recent formations, such as the ‘ultra-rightist’ España 
2000 (born in 2002) and Frente Nacional Español (born in 2006), both belonging to the 
populist ‘new right’ (Romero 2007). With respect to Spanish political movements and 
subcultural groups we selected some important nostalgic phalangist organizations such as 
the association Hermandad de la Vieja Guardia, Foro Social Manuel Mateo, and the student 
association Sindicato Universitario Español.  
The semi-structured questionnaire7 focused on several aspects related to extreme right 
mobilization: the strategies of action, the internal organizational characteristics (e.g. size, 
leadership style, internal discipline), and the relationship between the group and its social 
                                                     
5 The interviews were held between October 2010 and February 2011,  and conducted face to face. The length of 
the interviews varied between fifty minutes to one hour and a half. Despite initial difficulties in establishing the first 
preliminary contacts, the response rate was about 30% in both countries. 
6 As for the Italian case, we have intentionally excluded two political parties, the Northern League (LN) and National 
Alliance (AN), whose belonging to the extreme right party family is still under scholarly debate (see Mudde 2007: 56) 
7 Available from the authors upon request. 
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and political environment (i.e. friends’ and ‘foes’), including its norms and orientations toward 
the society and the political system (e.g. on political elites, democracy, immigration).  
Interview data are integrated, by means of a common research design, with a protest event 
analysis of the recent mobilization of these and other extreme right groups in Italy and Spain 
(from 2005 to 2009), based on press articles (two quality national newspapers have been 
selected: La Repubblica for Italy and El Pais for Spain)8. We have coded all collective events 
initiated by an identified extreme right organization as well as events attributed to extreme 
right sympathizers9. In regard to the definitional criteria, two aspects are important. The first 
concerns the range of forms of extreme right actions: since we are interested in all forms of 
mobilization by the extreme right, the spectrum of the ‘events’ coded goes from heavy forms 
of (physical) violence (against property or people, such as bombings, arson and shooting), to 
forms of verbal violence (such as nazi/racial graffiti or verbal abuse), as well as to forms of 
legal and non-violent actions (such as demonstrations and press conferences). The only 
actions we did not take into account were those taking place within the parliamentary arena. 
Secondly, as to the thematic focus of the covered events: our data include all acts performed 
by the extreme right, related to any type of issue field (from immigration, to political life, to 
economics) and any type of  target group (such as political adversaries, homosexuals and 
homeless people, the extreme right itself, etc.).The protest event analysis (for details see 
Koopmans and Rucht, 2002), allowed us to detect and quantify several properties of each 
mobilization event initiated by extreme right actors, such as its frequency, timing, duration, 
location, claims, size, carriers and targets, as well as action form. In total 485 events were 
identified and coded. 
Adopting a comparative approach, we focus on the extreme right in Spain and Italy, two 
countries that, in spite of the common authoritarian fascist past, show some differences in 
the political and cultural opportunities potentially relevant for the mobilization of extreme right 
organizations. In contrast to other European countries (e.g. France), the extreme right 
parties in both Italy and Spain, recorded only modest electoral results in the last years 
(Norris, 2005), obtaining therefore few channels of institutional access to the political 
system10. However, as for ‘allies’ in power, during the period of our studies, the Italian 
extreme right could have benefited from the presence of two center-right governments 
                                                     
8 It is commonly shared that multiplying the sources of the protest event analysis (e.g., relying on both media and 
judiciary sources, more newspapers of different political orientations for each country, etc.) is preferable in order to 
reduce the possible bias. However considerations of costs and time have determined our methodological choices. 
For instance, several studies have shown that taking two newspapers instead of one in general duplicate the coding 
time, without however increasing ‘the amount of events obtained by adding a second source’. The combination of 
two newspapers for example (e.g. of different ideological orientation) offer only one fourth of events more than each 
source individually (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002, 238). 
9 In order to be coded actions/events must be ‘collective’, in the sense that they relate to collective social problems 
and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems. 
10 Given their scarce electoral performances (always beyond the 3% of total vote), between 2000 and 2009,  no 
extreme right formation could obtain any seats in the national parliaments in Italy or in Spain (data of the Italian a 
Spanish Ministries of Interiors,   www.interno.it and www.mir.es). 
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(Government ‘Berlusconi III’, from April 2005 to May 2006 and ‘Berlusconi IV, from May 2008 
to November 2011). To the contrary, in Spain, where the extreme right has always received 
scarce support from the mainstream center-right parties (Casals, 2001), a hostile center-Left 
ruled uninterruptedly. Moreover, from a cultural and social point of view, according to many 
observers, the more recent (and more lasting) experience of the authoritarian fascist regime 
in Spain has provoked a stigmatization (or even ‘repulsion’, Ellwood, 1992, p. 381) of the 
extreme right; whereas in Italy during the last 10-15 years, the extreme right has ‘gradually 
become “normal” (…), more tolerated than before’ (Padovani 2008, 754). In addition, a 
cultural backwardness is observed in the Spanish extreme right, which has not been able to 
renew itself through the acquisition of the so-called New Right values and has ended up 
fragmented and completely detached from society (Rodríguez 2006). Nevertheless, the two 
countries are similar in terms of (scarce and rarely rigid) laws against extreme right groups11  
(Wetzel, 2009, pp. 265-67) and a diffused mistrust in representative institutions (Raxen 
200912 on Spain; EUMC, 2004, p. 17 on Italy), factors that can be exploited by the extreme 
right mobilization.  
                                                     
11 In Italy, the ‘Scelba Law’ (Law 645/1952) condemns the reorganization of the dissolved Fascist party and the 
apology of fascism; Moreover, the Italian ‘Mancino Law’ (Law 205/2993) and the Spanish Criminal Code (art. 22-4) 
condemn discriminatory behaviour on the basis of ideology, religion, ethnicity, race and nationality as well as 
incitement to hatred and violence. 
12 Informe Raxen 2009, ‘Violencia Neonazi y Crimines de Odio’: www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com 
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III. Violent or moderated? How the action strategies of the 
extreme right change in time and space 
What is the action repertoire that characterizes the political mobilization of the extreme right 
in Italy and Spain? How are the cycles between violence and more moderated action forms 
related to specific time(s) and contexts? Our data from the protest event analysis indicate 
that, in both countries, the level of violence fluctuated significantly in the last five years and 
does not present any linear trend (Fig.1).  
Figure 1: Violent actions by extreme right organizations in Italy and Spain (2005-2009) (%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our data from protest events 
Examining the intensity of radicalism (i.e. the percentage of violent actions on the total of 
actions registered) of right wing mobilization in Italy and Spain between 2005 and 2009, of 
the 485 total actions initiated by these groups (respectively, 338 in Italy and 147 in Spain), 
almost half of them were violent (41.9%). These actions range from acts of 'light' violence 
against people or things (such as insults, threats to social, religious or ethnic minorities13, 
graffiti or slogans in praise of fascism and Nazism14 and desecration of Jewish cemeteries15) 
to acts of ‘heavy’ violence, such as assaults against left-wing activists, homosexuals and 
immigrants16, even including bomb attacks against political opponents (e.g. offices of trade 
                                                     
13 E.g. racist slogans and Celtic crosses drawn on the walls of the Chinese quarter in Milano (La Repubblica, 15 
April 2007). 
14 E.g. in Italy, street rallies of extreme right groups chanting slogans in favour of the ‘Duce’ or Nazi mottos (La 
Repubblica, 1 May 2006).  
15 E.g. Swastikas, Celtic crosses and Nazi slogans painted in the Jewish quarter in Rome (La Repubblica, 12 July 
2006).  
16 E.g. Violent attacks by Nazi groups against young antifascists in Spain (El Pais, 9 January 2009) and against 
representatives of left-wing parties and antifascist militants in Italy (La Repubblica 14 and 27 January 2007, 6 
February 2007); threats, intimidations and assaults against homosexuals (La Repubblica, 01  and 25 February 
2007). 
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unions, squatted social centres, left-wing parties or leftist newspapers)17. Moreover, in a 
comparison between the two countries, the cycles of violence and moderate actions seem to 
culminate in more recent years (2008-2009) with a de-escalation in the action repertoire of 
extreme right groups in Spain and in an escalation of violence in Italy. 
These findings are also in line with those resulting from the interviews. In order to detect the 
degree of radicalism of the extreme right, we asked the representatives of the organizations 
to indicate (on a list of 27 forms of action) what types of actions the group resorts to and how 
frequently (if ‘regularly’ or ‘occasionally’). We classified the strategies of actions which 
emerged in 5 broader categories according to their degree of radicalism, namely: 
conventional, demonstrative, expressive, confrontational, and violent (Tarrow, 1989; Gentile, 
1999)18. The indexes, built for each of the five strategies, take into account both the scope of 
the repertoire of action used (by counting the number of activities used by the actor) and its 
intensity (by weighing regular activities twice as much as occasional ones)19. Finally, 
assigning increasing weights to each of the five indexes (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) a single additive index 
of ‘degree of radicalism’ of action was computed, ranging from 0 (minimum level of 
radicalism) to 15 (the maximum level).  
Looking at the action strategies of the extreme right according to the words of the 
protagonists (Fig. 2), we see that overall the degree of radicalism is lower in Spain than in 
Italy (with a value of 5.90 vs. 8.03). Indeed, as the figures show, Spanish extreme right 
organizations rely less frequently on the most radical forms of action (either confrontational 
or violent), mostly mobilizing using demonstrative and expressive actions (such as 
commemorative and honouring marches). In this regard, the representative of España 2000 
denies any violent behaviour in general on the part of his organization (‘in any event’), 
stressing that his party ‘tries not to do anything that might be illegal’ (Int. 17). Likewise, the 
representative of Frente Nacional Español is keen to make clear that ‘if clashes (e.g. violent 
clashes) occur they are always in self-defence (…)’ against ‘the aggressions by the extreme-
left’. When asked about the occurrence of violent confrontations with the police, he assesses 
that his party is not usually involved in these kind of clashes,  as the party provides its own 
                                                     
17 E.g. In Italy, the attacks with Molotov bombs against a squatted centre in Rimini (La Repubblica, 01 March 2006), 
and against the communist party headquarter in Taranto (01 January 2006); in Spain, the bomb attack against the 
socialist headquarter in Madrid (El Pais, 7 April 2006). 
18 The category ‘conventional actions’ includes those political actions associated with conventional politics (e.g. 
distributing press releases, organizing electoral campaigns, etc.). The category ‘demonstrative’ includes actions 
aiming to mobilize large numbers of people (e.g. petitions, street demonstrations). The category ‘expressive’ 
includes actions mainly directed (internally) towards the members of the group, in order to reinforce the in-group 
cohesion and identity (e.g. commemorations, cultural events, etc). The category ‘confrontational’ includes actions 
which are nonviolent, but usually illegal, whose aim is disrupting official policies or institutions (e.g. blockades, 
occupations etc.). The category ‘violent actions’ includes those events which imply some form of physical violence 
(e.g. violent clashes with political adversaries or the police etc.). 
19 Each index was standardized to the 0 to 1 range by dividing the resulting score by the maximum possible value. 
For example a value of ‘zero’ (e.g. on the ‘violent actions’ category) means that the given organization does not 
utilize any of the action forms which are included in the specific repertoire of action; a value of ‘1’ means that the 
organization uses the entire range of actions which belong to the given action strategy and it does that ‘regularly’.   
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security for political events ‘which ensures that if there are internal provocateurs (...), they 
are immediately expelled’ (Int. 15).  
Figure 2: Action forms of extreme right organizations in Italy and Spain (mean values). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: our data from interviews 
Moreover, the level of radicalism varies according to the type of extreme right group at stake. 
Both the interviews and the protest event20 data stress that, similarly in Italy and Spain, the 
most moderated groups are political parties and movements, whereas sub-cultural youth and 
neo-Nazi groups emerge as the most violent21 in their mobilization. In particular, as Figure 3 
shows, even according to the viewpoint of the protagonists, the organizations that recur 
more frequently to the most radical forms of action (namely confrontational and violent) are 
subcultural youth groups, whereas political movements and political parties less frequently 
use violent forms of action. This is in line with our hypothesis, suggesting that a higher 
degree of institutionalization of the group can discourage the use of violence.  
  
                                                     
20 According the protest event data, the relationship between the type of organization and the degree of radicalism 
(% of violent actions on the total events coded) appears to be strong and significant (Cramer  V 0.50*** Italy; .60*** 
Spain). 
21 Accounting for a score on the index of radicalism of 10.5 vs. 5.7 for political parties and movements respectively. 
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Figure 3: Action forms of extreme right organizations by type of organization (mean values). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our data from interviews 
Besides the number of violent actions, an additional indicator of the degree of radicalism is 
the number of participants (as well as the number of injured, arrested, stopped or 
denounced) in extreme right mobilization events. According to our data, the size of the 
events organized by the extreme right in Italy and Spain varies considerably (Fig. 4a), from 
thousands of participants to only a few activists. However, in both countries about one third 
of the events involved a limited (or very limited) number of participants (not more than 5-6 on 
average), confirming that most extreme right supporters engage in violent actions individually 
and not on behalf of any specific organization (TESAT, 2009). 
Figure 4: (a) Number of participants and (b) arrested/denounced/stopped people in extreme 
right mobilization events in Italy and Spain (2005-09) (absolute values).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our data from newspaper articles 
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Even the number of injured people in events organized by the extreme right is quite high, 
confirming an increase over time of radicalism in Italy (over 12 wounded in 2005 to about 21-
22, on average, in subsequent years) and a decrease in Spain (from 17 injuries in 2005 to 14 
in 2006 to about 5-8 in the following years). A rather different picture emerges when looking 
at the number of persons arrested, stopped or denounced during the events of the far right: 
120 instances in Italy and more than double that (249) in Spain (Fig. 4b). 
Considering these cycles between radical and moderate actions, what is the impact of the 
organizational and contextual factors on the strategic choices of the right wing groups? This 
is the question which we will attempt to answer in the next section. 
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IV. Extreme right and violence: between contextual 
opportunities and organizational factors 
As mentioned in the introduction, social-movement scholars argue that the size, forms and 
content of extreme right action are influenced by the political-institutional and cultural-
discursive opportunities, being more radical when they are closed (Koopmans et al., 2005). 
However, from a constructivist perspective, the impact of these factors strictly depends on 
‘the cultural interpretation, regardless of objective opportunities’ (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999, 
p. 33). Indeed, ‘there may be no such thing as objective political opportunities before or 
beneath interpretation – or at least none that matter; they are all interpreted through cultural 
filters’ (Ibid.). Accordingly, one question must be posed: how are the opportunities (and 
constraints) offered to the extreme right mobilization, in both the Italian and Spanish 
contexts, perceived by these actors? And how does this influence their strategic action 
choices?  
We asked the interviewees to evaluate the level of authorities’ repression toward their groups 
in their respective countries as well as to express a judgment on the strictness of the legal 
provisions against the extreme right22.  
Figure 5: Authorities repression and degree of radicalism of the extreme right in Italy and 
Spain (mean values, index of radicalism). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our data from interviews 
Our data show that the relationship between political opportunities and action forms (also) of 
extreme right organizations follow the expectations, with however, some specifications in the 
                                                     
22 For both the indicators, the answers (measured on a 0-10 scale, where 0 indicates low strictness of the legal 
constraints and repression by the authorities) were summarized in three categories according to the following: ‘not 
strict at all or a little’ (0-4), ‘somewhat’ (5-7), ‘very much’ (8-10).   
I H S — Caiani ; Borri / Between Violent and Non-Violent Action Strategies — 19 
two countries. In particular, in Spain, when the repressive strategies by authorities are 
perceived as hard, extreme right organizations tend to opt for moderate forms of action. In 
Italy, the opposite is true and the groups react by adopting more radical strategies. We can 
interpret these results by referring to the fact that, as underlined by social movement 
research, the relationship between ‘protest policing’ and radicalism of collective action is 
complex and might be ‘curvilinear’, leading for example to a de-radicalization of the most 
moderate fringes of the movements, but, at the same time, fuelling the most radical ones 
(della Porta, 1995). Indeed, according to our data we also see that a (perceived) extremely 
high level of repression seems to be more conducive to moderate action forms (Fig. 5). The 
same trend can be observed with respect to the strictness of legal constraints23. In this 
regard for example, the representative of the Italian Fronte Nazionale depicts the ‘Mancino 
law’ as a ‘sword of Damocles’ (Int. 10). Similarly, the speaker of the subcultural group Patria 
Nostra complains that the legal constraints in the country are too strict, and institutions react 
to every action of his group ‘immediately referring to the Scelba and Mancino laws […]’, so 
that they are ‘forced’ to act anyway ‘without caring about authorizations’ (Int. 3). 
Moreover, the impact of repression by the authorities on the action choices of right-wing 
groups seems to combine with the specificities of the organizational context within which 
such actions are developed (della Porta, 2005, p. 3). According to our data (data not 
showed), subcultural youth groups especially tend to react with the adoption of more violent 
action forms (+5.7 on the index of radicalism)24  vis-à-vis a hardening of state repression 
(from ‘not at all or a little’ to ‘somewhat’).  
In addition to the ‘protest policing’, we have also looked at other specific factors that can be 
considered part of the political opportunity structure of right-wing groups and which can 
influence their action strategies: (i) the degree of legitimacy of the extreme right as political 
actors in a country and (ii) the sense of political efficacy of the extreme right25. It might be 
expected indeed that when extreme right organizations perceive themselves as excluded 
from the political system or have a sense of ineffectiveness and stigmatization, this might 
foster the adoption of radical action strategies (Klandermans and Mayer, 2006).  
According to our data, in both countries, at an aggregate level, none of these factors seem to 
have an impact on the strategic choices of extreme right organizations. However, when 
                                                     
23 In the Italian case, the action forms of the extreme right tend to be more violent when legal constraints are 
perceived as stricter (from ‘not at all or a little’, to ‘somewhat’), while they appear more moderated in the presence of 
very restrictive legal provisions (‘a lot’). The values on the index of radicalism are respectively, 6.9, 8.7, 7.8. In the 
Spanish case, stricter legal constraints (from ‘somewhat’ to ‘a lot’) result in organizations reacting with more 
moderate action strategies (from 6.6 to 5.6). 
24 In the case of political movements and political parties the increase of action radicalism is, respectively, +1.9 and 
+5. 
25In order to investigate these factors, we asked our interviewees ‘whether the lack of recognition by the institutional 
actors is a problem for their organization’ and ‘whether they feel that they have opportunities to be heard by 
politicians’. Both indicators were measured on a scale 1-5, where 1 = ‘not at all’ and 5 = ‘a lot’. The answers were 
re-coded in 3 categories: ‘not at all or a little’ (values 1-2), ‘somewhat’ (3), ‘a lot’ (4-5).  
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looking at this relationship per type of organization, some specificities do emerge. Especially 
in the case of subcultural youth organizations, a scarce (sense of) political efficacy and 
recognition as legitimate political actor in the system is strictly tied to the use of more radical 
actions. The same closed opportunities to the contrary produce a much smaller reaction 
(variation in the degree of radicalism) in the action strategies of political movements and 
political parties (the latter ones not influenced at all by these variables)26 (Fig. 6). Indeed, as 
pointed out by the representative of the Sindicato Español Universitario ‘the fact of working 
in the university’ (thus, within an institutional setting) seems to foster the perception of 
political efficacy of the group by conferring ‘greater possibilities (...) to be heard by politicians’ 
(Int. 14). Likewise, the representative of the Italian political movement Area Destra explains 
the good relationship with the political institutions by stressing that his movement is 
extraneous from ‘the culture of extremism’, opting instead for a full ‘political integration’ (Int. 
1). Evidently, the organizational characteristics of a group (as in this case the degree of 
institutionalization) play a role in the relationship between the context and (their) action 
choices. As underlined for the discourses (i.e. frames) of social movements, that are 
constrained both by the context and the organizations’ own culture in the range of potentially 
useful arguments (Snow et al. 1986), it seems that the organizational structure also (e.g. 
formal vs. informal) poses some limits to the use of different actions. Indeed, the choice of 
action forms that are too radical might put the survival of the organization (e.g. one political 
party) under risk. At the same time, it might discourage those members who, having chosen 
to join more ‘conventional’, institutionalized organizations, might condemn too radical tactics. 
Conversely, those actors, such as subcultural youth and skinhead groups, that act outside 
institutional boundaries, dispose of the choice of a broader repertoire of action ranging from 
the most conventional and moderate forms of action to the most radical, even violent, forms. 
  
                                                     
26 When the institutional recognition is decreasing (from ‘not problematic at all’ to ‘very problematic’) the degree of 
radicalism increases from 9.6 to 11.6 in the case of subcultural groups; from 5.5 to 6.1 in the case of political 
movements and from 5.4 to 5.7 in the case of political parties. Moreover, when the level of political efficacy shrinks, 
the degree of radicalism increases from 8.3 to 11.6 for subcultural groups and from 5.5 to 6.2 for political 
movements. 
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Figure 6: Political legitimacy and degree of radicalism of the extreme right in Italy and Spain, 
all countries (mean values, index of radicalism)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our data from interviews 
Beyond the political context, social opportunities can also have an influence on the action 
repertoire. In our research we asked the extreme right organizations to assess the degree of 
social support they feel they have from society in their respective country27. Our data show 
that, in general, social support appears to affect the degree of radicalism of extreme right 
groups, with however again some specificities in the two countries. In the Italian case, a 
perceived low level of social support coincides with a more radical mobilization; conversely, 
in Spain, social distrust seems to push extreme right movements towards more moderate 
action strategies. Specifically, when the level of social support diminishes, the mean values 
on the index of radicalism are respectively: 7.1, 8.6, 9.2 in Italy and 8.1, 5.6, 5.2 in Spain. In 
this respect, the representative of the Spanish party Falange Autentica explains that the lack 
of support for their party is mainly due to the system, namely to the ‘boycott of the “regime”, 
the media, the courts’ being against them (Int. 16). Accordingly, within such an unfavourable 
context, the adoption of a moderate behaviour and the attempt to align with mainstream 
politics seems to be the only way to gain more social consensus. In sum, if in some cases, 
harsh repression and more stringent legal constraints lead to more moderate forms of 
collective action, in others they may create a widespread sense of injustice (Gamson, 
Fireman and Rytina, 1982), which encourages more radical practices (Goldstein 1983, p. 
340). 
                                                     
27 The question was: ‘What are the main problems for your organization?’. One of the options was ‘distrust, 
diffidence by the people’. The answers were measured on a scale 1-5 where 1 = ‘not at all’ and 5 = ‘very much a 
problem’. They were then recoded as follows: 1= ‘not at all or a little’ (values 1-2); ‘somewhat’ (3) and ‘a ‘very much’ 
(4-5). 
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V. Organizational factors and extreme right violence 
Moving from the political and cultural context to organizational factors, which are increasingly 
considered by research on violence and extremism as significant causes of radicalization 
(Sageman, 2004, Crenshaw, 2001), we have focused on three aspects particularly relevant 
for right wing organizations: (i) the degree of the group’s internal discipline (measured 
through an additive index derived from questions relating to members respect of 
organizational norms and leader decisions)28; (ii) the level of selectivity of the group 
(measured by looking at the selection criteria of the organization for new members)29, and, 
finally, (iii) the degree of pluralism of the organization (measured through a question 
concerning the ‘constituency’ addressed by the group)30.  
Our data show that, in general, the strategic action choices of extreme right organizations 
are influenced by the degree of internal discipline of the group, whereas the level of the 
group’s selectivity has an impact only in the Italian case. Furthermore, in both countries and 
in line with our expectations, when the internal discipline of a group is more rigid (from 
‘somewhat’ to ‘a lot’), its strategies of action tend to be more radical (passing from 7.9 to 8.1 
on the index of radicalism in the Italian case and from 5 to 6.3 in the Spanish case). 
Moreover, in Italy, those organizations which have more selective criteria for admission in the 
group (from ‘not at all or a little’ to ‘somewhat’ to ‘very selective’), are more likely to adopt 
radical forms of actions (passing from 6.4 to 8.6 to 11.5 on the index). This is also confirmed 
by the representative of the Italian Nuova Destra Sociale, who defines his party as peaceful 
and ‘very open toward the outside’, explaining that their organization does not have ‘any 
particular target in mind’, but instead has ‘a very soft approach in the selection of new 
members’ (Int. 4). A completely different opinion is demonstrated by the speaker of the 
subcultural Italian group, Veneto Fronte Skinheads, who emphasizes the importance of 
‘having highly selected and motivated members’ and stresses that his group is ‘more 
interested in passing on a message than having 2000 members’ (Int. 12). Contrary to our 
                                                     
28 This battery of questions, taken from a study by Stellmacher and Petzel (2005), aims at detecting the degree of 
conformity to internal norms within a group. Interviewees were asked for an opinion regarding conformity to internal 
rules, the role of internal dissent etc. (e.g. ‘The decisions and directives of the leader - or other directive body - 
should be respected under all circumstances.’). The answer options were ‘true’ and ‘false’. A value of 1 was 
assigned to those answers indicating a high degree of internal discipline requested by the organization to its 
members and a value of 0 to those answers indicating a low degree. Then, an index was computed combining the 
different answers. It ranged from 1 to 3, indicating a ‘low’ (value 1), ‘medium’ (2) and high (3) level of ‘internal 
discipline’ required from the organizations’ members. 
29 The organizations’ representatives were asked about the rules for becoming a member of the organization (open 
question). Organizations were classified as ‘not at all/a little selective’ (value 1), when no selection criteria are 
present; as ‘somewhat selective’ (2) when some specific criteria are indicated (e.g. exclusion of multiple 
memberships); and as ‘very selective’ (value 3) when very restrictive criteria (e.g. the previous screening of each 
member, probationary period, etc.) are applied. 
30 Interviewees were asked about which social categories their organization addresses (open answer). The answers 
were recoded as follows: ‘high internal pluralism’ (value 1), in the case of absence of a specific target group; 
‘medium’ (value 2), when the targets are general categories of people (e.g. ‘all those people who do not trust 
politics’); and ‘low pluralism’ (value 3) when specific target are indicated (e.g. ‘the working class’). 
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expectations, however, those organizations showing low levels of internal pluralism are the 
least prone to recur to violence31. 
                                                     
31 The degree of radicalism decreases from 8.6, to 8.2, to 7.2 in the Italian case and from 6.5, to 5.4, to 5.2 in the 
Spanish case at progressively lower degrees of internal pluralism (from high, to medium, to low degree of pluralism). 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this article the main differences and similarities in the strategic tactics (including violence) 
among different types of extreme right organizations in Italy and Spain have been illustrated 
and linked to their organizational characteristics and political opportunities in the respective 
contexts. 
Despite the limits of the interview sample (i.e. low N) brought about by the difficulties in 
interviewing ‘hidden communities’ (Blee 2009), and despite our focus on only one type of 
extremism, our analysis of the Italian and Spanish extreme right offers some interesting 
insights which can be considered a small empirical contribution to both social movement 
studies and research on political violence and extremism. First of all, our results highlight 
that, as it has been stressed for left-wing social movements (della Porta and Diani, 2006), 
extreme right organizations are also characterised by multifaceted action strategies and 
recur to a broad repertoire of action in their mobilization: from conventional actions related to 
the institutional arena to expressive and demonstrative actions (the ‘logic of bearing witness’ 
and ‘the logic of numbers’ as della Porta and Diani say), aimed at reinforcing the collective 
identity of the group and at showing its strength to the outside. Violence in particular is a 
strategy frequently used by these groups in Italy and Spain, as we have seen from the 
protest event data, however this has not been increasing (hopefully) in recent years. 
Nevertheless the organizational context in which the mobilization takes place seems to 
influence the preferred strategies of extreme right organizations, with subcultural youth 
groups in both countries more prone to use confrontational and violent actions. To the 
contrary, political parties and movements appeared mainly oriented toward expressive, 
conventional and demonstrative strategies – confirming that the repertoires of action cannot 
be regarded as mere instruments for the attainment of a goal (della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 
181).  
Secondly, our study has also highlighted that right wing strategic choices do not emerge in a 
vacuum, but are instead related to specific contextual and organizational factors, which can 
sometimes interact with each other (as shown by the different effects of the macro level 
factors according to the various types of organizations).  As for macro level factors, 
according to our interview data, the political opportunities (in particular the strictness of legal 
constraints and authorities’ repression, and the degree of support from society) influence the 
strategic choices (moderated vs. violent) of extreme right actors, however, with some 
national specificities. More specifically, in the Italian case, in line with expectations, more 
open (perceived) political opportunities (namely: fewer legal constraints, lower repression, 
higher degree of social support) seem to favour the adoption of more moderate forms of 
action by extreme right organizations. Conversely, the same factors appear to encourage 
right wing violence in Spain.  Moreover, in both countries, contrary to our expectations, other 
political contextual factors, often related to the emergence of violence by collective actors, 
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such as the perceived exclusion from the political system in terms of recognition and 
possibility of being heard by politicians, do not appear to affect (or only slightly affect) the 
strategic choices of the organizations.  
Our focus on the group’s assessment of opportunities and threats can help us to better 
understand the link between the macro and meso level factors. As stressed by Meyer et al. 
(2002, p. 130), ‘different structures within movement communities can also be linked to the 
perception of political opportunity that can mobilize action’.  Therefore, we can try to explain 
the divergent impact of the context on right wing mobilization by referring to more specific 
(relational, situational) dimensions of the political opportunities offered to these groups, as 
well as to the tradition of interaction between challengers and elites (della Porta e Diani, 
2006, p. 184). Taking into account that the forms of action of a movement might stem from 
considerations related more to the ‘realized outcomes’ than to the ‘expected utility’ 
(Koopmans, 2005, p. 25), we could therefore consider that, despite similar perceptions of the 
hardness of state repression, the strategic choices of these organizations might have been 
led by ‘backward-rational’ considerations (Ibid.) related to the actual risks of collective action. 
On the one hand, as shown by our data, the centre-left government in Spain during the 
period under analysis leads to a sharp increase (especially in 2008-09) in the arrests, 
detentions and denounces related to actions of the extreme right. On the other hand, Italy’s 
centre-right government (‘Berlusconi IV’) reduced the repressive activities (with a drop in the 
number of arrests, detentions and denounces during extreme right events in the first year of 
government), and opened itself to some extent to the far-right (e.g. with the inclusion in the 
Berlusconi’s coalition of extreme right formations). This result confirms the complexity of the 
relationship between the context and the action choices of collective actors (Goodwin and 
Jasper, 1999; Koopmans, 2005).  
Finally, our analysis pointed out that, beyond (and in interaction with) political opportunities, 
the internal organizational characteristics of extreme right groups also affect their action 
strategies. According to our data, in the period under investigation, the use of violence by 
extreme right groups seems to be linked either to the size of the group (with many violent 
events initiated by individual or very few activists), or to a rigid internal discipline and 
(especially in Italy) a high degree of selectivity. This seems to suggest that the choice of one 
specific organizational form over another is a clear message that the organization gives to its 
members (Kitschelt, 1988) and also involves different reactions to the occurrence of specific 
situations. Also this confirms, as shown by studies of other types of extremism, that 
contextual factors are not alone sufficient conditions to explain the emergence of violence, 
but are instead intertwined with meso level organizational characteristics and dynamics of 
radical groups (Crenshaw, 2001). 
Additional comparative empirical studies, both on more countries and on different types of 
extremisms, are desirable for the future in order to investigate, on a larger scale, the impact 
of contextual and organizational factors on the strategic choices of collective actors. This 
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could increase our understanding if the same mechanisms between contextual opportunities 
and organizational action choices (toward moderation vs. violence) are at stake in different 
(radical) groups and different countries.  
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VIII. Appendix 
 
Quoted interviews 
 
A. Italy: 
ID. 1 Political movement ‘Area Destra’. Rome, 23 September 2010. 
ID. 2 Political movement ‘Movimento Nazional Popolare’. Rome, 21 September  2010. 
ID. 3 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Patria Nostra’. Rome, 22 September 2010. 
ID. 4 Political movement ‘Nuova Destra Sociale’. Florence, 6 October  2010 
ID. 5 Political movement ‘Fascismo e Libertà’. Telephone interview, 3 November 2010. 
ID. 6 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Casapound’. Rome, 19 November  2010. 
ID. 7 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Gioventù Italiana’. Rome, 3 December 2010 
ID. 8 Political party ‘Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore’. Rome, 18 November 2010. 
ID. 9 Political party ‘La Destra’. Rome, 16 December 2010 
ID. 10 Political party ‘Fronte Sociale Nazionale’. Rome, 16 December 2010 
ID. 11 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Lotta Studentesca’. Rome, 17 December 2010 
ID. 12 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Veneto Fronte Skinhead’. Rome, 27 December  2010 
 
B. Spain: 
ID. 13 Political party ‘Falange Española’. Madrid, 14 February 2011 
ID. 14 Sub-cultural youth group ‘Sindicato Universitario Español’. Madrid, 14 February  2011 
ID. 15 Political party ‘Frente Nacional Español’. 21 February 2011 
ID. 16 Political party ‘Falange Autentica’. Madrid, 15 February 2011 
ID. 17 Political party ‘España 2000’. Alcalà de Henares, 17 February 2011 
ID. 18 Political party ‘Falange de las JONS’. Madrid, 18 February 2011 
ID. 19 Political movement ‘Hermandad de la Vieja Guardia’. Madrid, 28 May 2011 
ID. 20 Political movement: Foro Social Manuel Mateo. Madrid, 27 May 2011 
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